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Ian Taylor (2014), Africa Rising?: BRICS – Diversifying Dependency,
Woodbridge, U.K. & Rochester, NY: James Currey, ISBN 97818470 
10964, 208 pp.  
 
Ian Taylor tackles two hot topics in recent debates on Africa. One is the 
“Africa rising” trope, largely derived from recent growth records across a 
variety of African nations; the other is the engagement in Africa of the 
emerging economies – namely, Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC). As 
the two themes are clearly interrelated, it makes sense to treat them in a 
single monograph. In fact, the book’s greatest value is its laying out of the 
extent to which the trends interrelate. Taylor shows how the growth in 
African economies has coincided with a boom in commodity prices over 
the past decade, which in turn can largely be attributed to growing re-
source hunger in China and, to a lesser degree, in India and Brazil. As the 
lack of diversification in African economies has intensified (127-129), the 
BRIC states – as trading partners – have not helped African economies in 
structural terms. Thus, Taylor argues that the BRIC states’ efforts in Africa 
essentially reify the continent’s historical dependence on resource extrac-
tion, which has resulted in the “jobless growth” of the past decade and 
deindustrialization (139-141), and which has – presumably – contributed 
to the further entrenchment of neopatrimonial modes of government 
within African regimes. Taylor’s pessimistic claims are backed by helpful 
individual analyses of Brazil, Russia, India and China in Africa, in which he 
delineates their differences with regard to style, interest and strategy (South 
Africa, the “S” in “BRICS”, is not regarded as an emerging economy by 
Taylor and is therefore not included in his analysis).  
Yet, one wonders whether Taylor took the “noise” around a rising 
Africa a bit too seriously. After all, few commentators aside from in-
vestment gurus and consultant firms portray Africa in such a rosy light. 
Most prominently, The Economist made a U-turn in its headline assess-
ment (from “a hopeless continent” in 2000 to a “hopeful” one in 2013), 
but the 2013 special report also recognized the elephant in the room: the 
fact that much of the recent growth resulted from a natural-resource 
bonanza. Independent economists have been cautious with regard to the 
“Africa rising” thesis, although government representatives, investment 
managers and the World Economic Forum, all quoted by Taylor, do not 
share their scepticism. The “rising Africa” trope was also partly a reac-
tion to the Afro-pessimism of the 1990s and its postcolonial undertones.  
Similarly, by exposing the fact that emerging economies are not 
proposing an “alternative economic paradigm” in Africa, Taylor chose a 
particularly weak straw man. Most academic commentators highlight the 
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BRIC states’ ambiguous effects in Africa. At least in the Western sphere, 
there is a pronounced scepticism vis-à-vis the BRIC states and their inten-
tions in Africa. China has long been struggling with its dismal reputation as 
a mere resource extractor unwilling to employ locals. In Mozambique, for 
instance, accusations of Chinese illegal logging and the view that Chinese-
built infrastructure is of poor quality are more widespread than the belief 
that China or the other BRIC countries are at the vanguard of an alterna-
tive economic paradigm. More recently, investments in mining by the 
Brazilian company Vale aroused considerable protest from displaced lo-
cals, and projects by two Indian companies – Rites and Ircon, contracted 
to reconstruct a vital rail link between the port in Beira and landlocked 
coal mines – were delayed to the point that authorities cancelled their con-
tracts in 2011. All of this happened against the backdrop of extensive 
investments in resource extraction from Brazil, India and South Africa 
(among others) and a public debate around the shortcomings of resource-
based growth in terms of poverty alleviation and employment. Thus, the 
celebration of South–South solidarity as a panacea for African develop-
ment seems to be confined to BRIC and IBSA statements.  
Taylor’s claim that BRIC states are merely diversifying African de-
pendency is based on his description of the BRIC states as almost exclu-
sively focused on resource extraction and as “rigidly doctrinaire” in both 
their “application of neoliberal policies” and the principle of non-inter-
ference in dealing with African governments. Their rhetoric notwith-
standing, the impact of the emerging economies in Africa, according to 
Taylor, was structurally similar to that of the established powers. Taylor 
also writes that the BRIC states had nothing in common with each other 
beyond their rhetoric and significantly rising GDPs. These assertions are 
debatable at best: While relevant differences between emerging econo-
mies in Africa and their Northern competitors persist, the fact that Afri-
can states remain relatively less powerful vis-à-vis both groups does not 
alter that. Consider, for instance, the prominent role played by the state 
both within BRIC countries and in their relations towards Africa, which 
is markedly different from the role the state generally plays in Western-
style capitalism. The development bank that the BRIC states are envi-
sioning and the effective coalition-building they have been undertaking 
amongst themselves in various global negotiations since the turn of the 
millennium are noteworthy, too. Moreover, aid from BRIC states has at 
least some characteristics that distinguish it from Western countries’ 
modes of development cooperation. Taylor notes the export of medicine 
from India to Africa and successes in overcoming rigid patent laws up-
held by Western countries in the fight against HIV/AIDS. These are 
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pertinent differences, which brings me to other lines of argumentation I 
disagree with: Taylor’s overly negative portrayal of emerging economies 
as partners in trade and aid along with his dismissal of any positive de-
velopments in the wake of Africa’s recent growth records.  
First, competition in trade bolsters the negotiating position held by 
African governments. Take, for instance, India’s unilateral opening to-
wards least developed countries, noted by Taylor. This is surely a posi-
tive step from an African perspective, as it precipitated the OECD 
countries’ opening markets in some areas in order to remain competitive. 
More fundamentally, having a more diverse group of potential customers 
decreases the dependency inherent to resource-based economies, albeit 
insufficiently. And if we decry African states’ lack of power and influ-
ence on the global stage, then the emergence of new and diverse partners 
willing to ally with African governments – out of whatever strategic 
interests – appears to be a rather favourable political development, as 
well. Take Brasília’s two-faced identity manifested in the claim to global 
status, on the one hand, and its historical preference for multilateralism 
(42-43), on the other. In fact, Brazil is highly unlikely to achieve the kind 
of global status it seeks anytime soon. Thus, no matter what the rationale 
behind its approach to international politics is, middle-power characteris-
tics are unlikely to dissipate (not least because of recent poor growth 
figures), and multilateralism is as deeply engrained into the foreign policy 
establishment as is the demand for global status. Thus, underscoring 
Brazil’s desire to gain global-power status while belittling the characteris-
tics of middle-power multilateralism when debating Brazil’s relations 
with Africa is somewhat unfair.  
Likewise, the increasing engagement of emerging economies in for-
eign aid, as Taylor notes, may have positive effects. OECD donors in 
many countries have harmonized their development policies since the 
Paris Declaration in 2005. New donors do not want to be part of these alli-
ances. On the one hand, this undermines Western attempts to improve 
governance, democratic standards and the rule of law by conditionality 
(whose effectiveness is debatable). On the other hand, it gives African 
regimes a choice where they had (almost) none before. Moreover, Taylor 
does admit that “technology, advice and professional assistance from a 
country such as Brazil that already practises policies domestically in a de-
velopmental setting may be more useful to recipient countries’ needs than 
that offered by the traditional donors” (51). Consider the hugely successful 
Brazilian social assistance scheme as a model for (much less developed) 
African countries. Yet, concrete examples with the potential to shed a 
more benign light on the presence of emerging economies in Africa, such 
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as Brazilian aid towards democracy promotion in Guinea-Bissau, go un-
mentioned. Or consider Brazil’s “ethanol diplomacy”, which seeks to 
establish a global market for biofuels based on Brazilian technology. This, 
Taylor suggests, was exemplary of the replacement of one dependency (oil) 
with another (biofuels). The “ethanol diplomacy” is a fascinating aspect of 
Brasília’s foreign policy, and its effects in Africa are surely noteworthy. Yet, 
Taylor fails to mention both potential benefits of the production of bio-
fuels for developing countries and the fact that the high level of attention 
it enjoyed under President Lula da Silva has effectively come to an end as a 
result of an ailing domestic ethanol industry. Future research should look 
in more detail into the forms of cooperation between new donors and 
African states before dismissing such cooperation as a mere tool of power 
politics or as detrimental to Western aid efforts, or both.   
Second, the “rising Africa” trope was essentially based on the claim 
that a middle class was emerging where there was none before, this claim 
sometimes being augmented by references to new technology such as 
mobile banking. Taylor questions these claims convincingly (24), yet one 
wonders whether there wasn’t a kernel of truth in the argument that a 
larger (though comparatively small in a global context), more urbanized 
and better-educated middle class did make a difference in some African 
countries. Surely, the issue merits a more detailed treatment – by refer-
ence to either macro-indicators (health, education) or individual cases.  
Third, the book deserved a more thorough edit. Some quotes are 
difficult to read and, in certain cases, quoted authors seem to contradict 
each other (for example, on the principles underlying Russian foreign 
policy, 64-68). In other instances, the text becomes somewhat declara-
tory when quotes are not backed by empirical information. For instance, 
Taylor quotes a source stating that support for Brazilian foreign policy 
was a de facto requirement for being granted assistance from Brasília (51). 
This is surely an important piece of information, yet no further explana-
tion is given with regard to what kind of support Brasília asked for and in 
what instances such informal conditionality was applied. The same is true 
with regard to Indian conditionality and Taylor’s critique that Brazilian 
businesses did not provide employment opportunities for locals (48). With 
fewer quotes and less repetition, Taylor would have had the space to in-
clude examples from some of those countries with particularly close rela-
tionships with BRIC states, which could have both backed his overall 
claim (“diversifying dependency”) and increased our understanding of the 
actual differences among emerging economies and/or between BRIC 
states and the established powers.  
 Johannes Plagemann 
